We analyse the endogenous choice of the competition mode (price vs. quantity) in a duopoly model with managerial delegation and unionized labor markets. Depending on the unions’ relative bargaining power and the degree of product differentiation, the set of possible outcomes proves to be very rich, including alternatively a unique quantity or price equilibrium as well as multiple asymmetric-type equilibria.
A note on endogenous competition mode with managerial-unionized firms
MECCHERI, NICOLA
;FANTI, LUCIANO
2018-01-01
Abstract
We analyse the endogenous choice of the competition mode (price vs. quantity) in a duopoly model with managerial delegation and unionized labor markets. Depending on the unions’ relative bargaining power and the degree of product differentiation, the set of possible outcomes proves to be very rich, including alternatively a unique quantity or price equilibrium as well as multiple asymmetric-type equilibria.File in questo prodotto:
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