Kolnai and Aristotle on the Role of Proximity in Fear and Disgust

After an introduction in section 1 to the relevance of Aristotle in Kolnai’s phenomenological method, section 2 explains why Kolnai thinks that disgust cannot be understood either as a form of fear or as a merely visceral reaction (like nausea). Section 3 examines the role of proximity in fear and, by contrasting Kolnai’s and Aristotle’s accounts, it discloses their deep similarity. Section 4 is devoted to proximity in disgust and to the ambivalence that characterizes this emotion. Section 5 shows why proximity has both a subjective and an objective meaning in the case of disgust. On the one hand, it characterizes the relationship between the subject of the emotion and the disgusting object (which is felt to be too close). On the other hand, it refers to the constitution of the disgusting object itself, and invites attraction and repulsion by putting us in touch with a world of transformation and decay towards which we feel deep affinity.