Costi di transazione e meccanismi di governance nel mercato della corruzione

The article aims at singling out the main analytical and policy implications from the application of transaction costs theory to the study of illegal markets, with a special focus on the market for corruption. The purpose is to shade light on governance structures which can contribute to the emergence of informal institutions in the interactions between corruptors and corruptees, reducing uncertainty in the fulfillment of reciprocal obligations. After reviewing the first, second and third-party enforcement mechanisms which can reduce ex-post transaction costs, main variables are discussed determinining their relative effectiveness in the market for corruption. Three potential equilibria can emerge in the informal regulation of hidden exchanges: petty, systemic and organized corruption. After a survey of the role of some individual and collective actors as providers of protection, a discussion is presented of the implication of previous analysis on policy tools which can undermine governance mechanisms of corruption, with a brief comparison with the main measures introduced in the Italian system after the approval of law 190/2012