A revisitation of the peculiar Breit-Lange model of 1934, where production was organized in large self-managed trusts. In order to break the market power and the restrictive tendencies of the latter, a peculiar institution was envisaged, that of workers’ right to become a member of the trust of his choice. I discuss in particular the following issues: where did Breit and Lange took this peculiar institution from? What would happen in a market economy, socialist or otherwise, in case of introduction of such an institution? As to the first question it turned out that the feature of employment on demand was typical, with different connotations, of a family of non-Marxian socialist models, following that of Marx’s arch-enemy Eugen Dühring. In Breit and Lange however an important aspect of these models is missing, the belief of the lack of justification of land rent and the belief that free access to land, unhindered by rent, could provide a kind of “outside option”, allowing to avoid both the miseries of unemployment and those of industrial employment, a sort of reversal of the process of expulsion from land following the enclosures. In the specific world of Breit and Lange, there no such a need, since full employment is automatically guaranteed, together with self-management, in the industrial economy. As to the introduction of some form of employment on demand providing a guaranteed outside option for the unemployed, this seems a fascinating idea, but one that could not work in practice because of the specificities of the employment relationship and of the consequences of imperfect and asymmetric information.
The Lange-Breit Model, the Right to Employment, and the Outside Option
CHILOSI, ALBERTO
2005-01-01
Abstract
A revisitation of the peculiar Breit-Lange model of 1934, where production was organized in large self-managed trusts. In order to break the market power and the restrictive tendencies of the latter, a peculiar institution was envisaged, that of workers’ right to become a member of the trust of his choice. I discuss in particular the following issues: where did Breit and Lange took this peculiar institution from? What would happen in a market economy, socialist or otherwise, in case of introduction of such an institution? As to the first question it turned out that the feature of employment on demand was typical, with different connotations, of a family of non-Marxian socialist models, following that of Marx’s arch-enemy Eugen Dühring. In Breit and Lange however an important aspect of these models is missing, the belief of the lack of justification of land rent and the belief that free access to land, unhindered by rent, could provide a kind of “outside option”, allowing to avoid both the miseries of unemployment and those of industrial employment, a sort of reversal of the process of expulsion from land following the enclosures. In the specific world of Breit and Lange, there no such a need, since full employment is automatically guaranteed, together with self-management, in the industrial economy. As to the introduction of some form of employment on demand providing a guaranteed outside option for the unemployed, this seems a fascinating idea, but one that could not work in practice because of the specificities of the employment relationship and of the consequences of imperfect and asymmetric information.I documenti in IRIS sono protetti da copyright e tutti i diritti sono riservati, salvo diversa indicazione.
