This research revisits the theoretical literature on codetermination in differentiated Cournot duopoly markets. Although codetermination is widely adopted in some north European countries, the theoretical analysis is restricted to a few number of works. The literature is led by Kraft (1998), who shows that codetermination emerges as a market outcome (sub-optimal Nash equilibrium) in a quantity-setting duopoly with homogeneous products. However, there exists evidence that codetermination is quite absent in countries where there are no specific laws. This article shows that codetermination cannot emerge as a Nash equilibrium when products are sufficiently differentiated (even when they are complementary). These results also hold by considering R&D activities.

Codetermination and product differentiation

Luciano Fanti;Luca Gori
;
Mauro Sodini
2018-01-01

Abstract

This research revisits the theoretical literature on codetermination in differentiated Cournot duopoly markets. Although codetermination is widely adopted in some north European countries, the theoretical analysis is restricted to a few number of works. The literature is led by Kraft (1998), who shows that codetermination emerges as a market outcome (sub-optimal Nash equilibrium) in a quantity-setting duopoly with homogeneous products. However, there exists evidence that codetermination is quite absent in countries where there are no specific laws. This article shows that codetermination cannot emerge as a Nash equilibrium when products are sufficiently differentiated (even when they are complementary). These results also hold by considering R&D activities.
2018
Fanti, Luciano; Gori, Luca; Sodini, Mauro
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Utilizza questo identificativo per citare o creare un link a questo documento: https://hdl.handle.net/11568/938701
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