This chapter explores the links that exist between political corruption and mafia-like organised crime, shedding light on modalities, resources and actors’strategies of interaction, in an attempt to deconstruct stereotypical representations and reductionist views. We try to empirically capture and explain the variation in these relationships both across territories and over time focusing on Italy, a country which has recently experienced flexible and sophisticated modalities of corrupt exchanges and of organisational adaptation, in addition to longer-lasting and better-established forms of collusion. Firstly, we provide a critical assessment of some of the current ideas and approaches regarding the interaction between political corruption and organized crime, providing a definition of the link which enables an empirical understanding of its variation in time and space. Secondly, we briefly examine the modalities, resources, and strategies of such relationships, classifying them into two distinct categories: 1) mafia-like groups as traders in corrupt exchanges and 2) mafia-like groups as regulators of corrupt transactions. Thirdly, we propose and discuss a typology that highlights the variability of this relationship. Finally, by looking at the Italian case we are able to assess some of the most recent developments of this political-criminal nexus.
Mafia and political corruption in Italy
Vannucci, Alberto
;Sberna, Salvatore
2019-01-01
Abstract
This chapter explores the links that exist between political corruption and mafia-like organised crime, shedding light on modalities, resources and actors’strategies of interaction, in an attempt to deconstruct stereotypical representations and reductionist views. We try to empirically capture and explain the variation in these relationships both across territories and over time focusing on Italy, a country which has recently experienced flexible and sophisticated modalities of corrupt exchanges and of organisational adaptation, in addition to longer-lasting and better-established forms of collusion. Firstly, we provide a critical assessment of some of the current ideas and approaches regarding the interaction between political corruption and organized crime, providing a definition of the link which enables an empirical understanding of its variation in time and space. Secondly, we briefly examine the modalities, resources, and strategies of such relationships, classifying them into two distinct categories: 1) mafia-like groups as traders in corrupt exchanges and 2) mafia-like groups as regulators of corrupt transactions. Thirdly, we propose and discuss a typology that highlights the variability of this relationship. Finally, by looking at the Italian case we are able to assess some of the most recent developments of this political-criminal nexus.File | Dimensione | Formato | |
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