Plotinus’ treatise V 4[7], How that which is after the First comes from the First, and on the One argues that Intellect, that coincides with the intelligible Forms, stands as a second principle after the One, whose absolute simplicity implies transcendence even to this degree of being, the highest. Translated into Arabic in the first half of the 9th/3rd century, How that which is after the First comes from the First, and on the One was combined with other treatises of Ennead Five in an Epistle on the Divine Science falsely attributed to al-Fārābī. This paper investigates the adaptations that characterise the Arabic rendering of V 4[7], and compares the Arabic rendition with the coeval translations of Aristotle’s Metaphysics and De Anima. The issue at stake is that of the nature of the first principle: is it an intellect, or beyond intellect?
God and Intellect at the Dawn of Arabic Philosophical Thought Plotinus’ How Things Come After the First, Aristotle’s Metaphysics and the De Anima in the Age of al-Kindī
D'Ancona Cristina
2018-01-01
Abstract
Plotinus’ treatise V 4[7], How that which is after the First comes from the First, and on the One argues that Intellect, that coincides with the intelligible Forms, stands as a second principle after the One, whose absolute simplicity implies transcendence even to this degree of being, the highest. Translated into Arabic in the first half of the 9th/3rd century, How that which is after the First comes from the First, and on the One was combined with other treatises of Ennead Five in an Epistle on the Divine Science falsely attributed to al-Fārābī. This paper investigates the adaptations that characterise the Arabic rendering of V 4[7], and compares the Arabic rendition with the coeval translations of Aristotle’s Metaphysics and De Anima. The issue at stake is that of the nature of the first principle: is it an intellect, or beyond intellect?I documenti in IRIS sono protetti da copyright e tutti i diritti sono riservati, salvo diversa indicazione.
